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LIABILITY OF INSURER FOR WRONGFUL DEATHFAILURE TO DETERMINE POLICYHOLDER'S INTEREST
In the recent case of Liberty National Life Insurance Company v. Weldon,
100 So. 2d 696 (Ala. 1957), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that three
life insurance companies ' were liable in a wrongful death action for failing
to exercise reasonable care in issuing life insurance policies to one having no
insurable interest.
There are two primary questions set forth in this case: (1) whether a
life insurance company is negligent in issuing a life insurance policy to one
having no insurable interest,2 and (2) whether such negligence is the proximate cause of the death of the insured, when the insured is murdered by the
beneficiary in whose favor the policy was issued.
Briefly, the facts are as follows: On December 1, 1951, Mrs. Earl Dennison purchased a life insurance policy from the Liberty National Life Insurance
Company in which she designated Shirley Dianne Weldon as the insured and
herself as the beneficiary. In March, 1952, a similar policy was obtained
from the Southern Life Insurance Company. And on April 23, 1952, a
third policy was issued by the National Life Insurance Company, similar to
the two previous ones. On May 1, 1952, Shirley Dianne Weldon, a child of
two and a half years of age, was murdered by her aunt-in-law, Mrs. Dennison.
Mr. Gaston Weldon, the father of the deceased, brought this suit against the
defendant insurance companies under Alabama's Homicide Statute.4 Suit was
predicated on the theory that the insurance companies were negligent in issuing
the life insurance policies to Mrs. Dennison without ascertaining whether
she had an insurable interest, and that their negligence was the proximate cause
of the child's death. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $75,000. In affirming the judgment of the trial court,
the Supreme Court of Alabama held that the insurance companies failed in
their duty to exercise reasonable care by issuing life insurance policies to Mrs.
Dennison without determining whether she had the required insurable in1 Liberty National Life Insurance Co., National Life Insurance Co., and Southern Life Insurance
Co.

2
Rakestraw v. Cincinnati, 690 Ohio App. 504, 44 N.E.2d 278 (1942); Young v. Hipple,
273 Pa. 439, 117 A. 185, 25 A.L.R. 154 (1922); See 29 AM. JUR. 353. An insurable interest
exists where there is a reasonable ground founded upon the relations of the parties to each other,
either pecuniary, contractual, or by blood or affinity to expect some benefit or advantage from the
continuance of the life of the insured.
3 Mrs. Dennison was the wife of Mrs. Weldon's deceased brother. The aunt and niece relationship was created by marriage, not by blood.
4 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 119 (1940). This statute has reference to wrongful death actions, though
commonly known as the "Homicide Statute".
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terest, and their negligence was the proximate cause of Shirley Weldon's death,
for the insurance companies should have reasonably foreseen that Mrs. Dennison might be induced, by the prospect of collecting the insurance proceeds
from the policies, to take the child's life. Speaking for the Court, Judge
Lawson said:
"The duty which is upon all persons to exercise reasonable care not to
injure another, requires of life insurance companies the .exercise of reasonable
care not to issue policies of life insurance in favor of a beneficiary who has no
interest in the continuation of the life of the insured, a policy which is void as

against public policy because it opens 'a wide door by which a constant temptation is created to commit for profit the most atrocious crimes'.' 5
Mrs. Dennison, as the aunt-in-law of the insured, clearly did not have
the necessary insurable interest. A relationship of this nature has been held
prima facie to be insufficient to sustain an insurable interest.' Mrs. Dennison
could not reasonably expect future benefits from the child's continued life.
The child was living with her parents in a different town several miles away,
and Mrs. Dennison made only infrequent visits to the Weldon home.7 In
spite of this, and Mrs. Dennison's representation as the aunt of the child,
none of the insurance companies made a reasonable investigation to determine
exactly what relationship existed between the parties.'
The reason generally stated for the requirement of insurable interest is
to prevent wagering or gambling contracts. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Paschuck v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,' in
referring to the statute " requiring insurable interest, said: "The purpose of
this Act of Assembly was to prevent wagering contracts on the life of another
by one having no insurable interest therein." However, by carrying this line
of thought to its ultimate conclusion, it can reasonably be seen that a further
basis for the rule is to prevent the temptation by the beneficiary to shorten
the life of the insured in order to collect the insurance proceeds. Many courts
have recognized that a person who gambles on another's life, may possibly
attempt to make sure of his gamble. The Court in the Weldon case adopted
the language stated in the Alabama case of Helmetag's v. Miller: "
"The reason of the law which vitiates wager policies, is the pecuniary
interest, which the holder has in procuring the death of the subject of the in5 100

So.2d

at 708.

Commonwealth Life Insurance Co. v. George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So.2d 910 (1947); People's
First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Christ, 361 Pa. 423, 65 A.2d 393 (1949); Appleman, INSURANCE LAWS AND PRACTICE § 822 (1941).
7 100 So.2d at 704.
8Id. at 708.
9 124 Pa. Super, 406, 188 A. 614 (1936).
10 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 512 (1921).
11 76 Ala. 183, 52 Am. Rep. 316 (1884).
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surance, thus opening a wide door in which a constant temptation is created to

commit for profit the most atrocious crimes."
In the case of Warnock v. Davis," the Supreme Court of the United
states said:
"Otherwise the policy is a mere wager, by which the party taking the
policy is directly interested in the early death of the insured. Such policies
have a tendency to create a desire for the event.

They are therefore, in-

dependent of any statute on the subject, condemned as being against public
policy."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of First National Bank of
Glen Campbell v. Burnside National Bank," stated:
"In no class of insurance has the law been stricter on the subject of insurable interest than it has been in life insurance, and this for the obvious
reason that speculative life insurance has a tendency to and at times has resulted
in murder."
The principle that a life insurance policy issued in favor of one having
no insurable interest is illegal and void is well-settled.'" There is some
difficulty, however, in determining whether the statutes or the case law requiring insurable interest are in force to prevent the insurer from issuing
such policies in order to protect the insured, or to prevent the purchaser from
buying them, since the insurer will not be liable for the value of the policies
on the basis that they are illegal and void. Whether the rule is by judicial
mandate as in Alabama, or by statute as in Pennsylvania, mere violation of
the rule will not impose liability on the insurer. It must be shown that the
intent of the legislatures or the courts was to protect the plaintiff or the class
of persons of which he is a member. Therefore, if it can be concluded that
one of the reasons behind the insurable interest rule is to protect the insured
from an untimely death at the hands of the beneficiary, the insurer's violation
of the rule is a breach of the duty owed to the insured and therefore constitutes negligence. The duty required here is one which is fundamental in
the law. That is the duty which is imposed upon all of us to exercise reasonable care not to injure another. On this 'basis, negligence of the insured is
based on issuance of such policies where there is an absence of fraud or deception by the purchaser of the insurance policy. As between insurer and
purchaser, it seems more reasonable to put the burden on the insurer, because
he is in a better position to know the law and to take steps to prevent such
U.S. 775 (1881).
Pa. 536, 172 A. 641 (1934).
14 Grigsby v. Russel, 222 U.S. 149 (1911); VANCE, INSURANCE § 28 (3d Ed. 1951).
12 104
13 314
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policies from being issued. While it is true that ignorance of the law is generally no defense, it does not prevent a person having no insurable interest
from purchasing a policy, and then committing murder in the belief that the
policy is valid as did Mrs. Dennison in the Weldon case. The Court in the
Weldon case declared the purpose of the insurable interest rule to be to protect
human beings when it said:
"The defendants seem to be of the opinion that the insurable interest
rule is to protect insurance companies. We do not agree. The rule is designed
to protect human life. Policies in violation of the insurable interest rule are
not dangerous because they are illegal; they are illegal because they are
dangerous.
As we have shown, it has long been recognized by this court and practically all courts in this country that an insured is placed in a position of extreme
danger where a policy of insurance is issued on his life in favor of a beneficiary
who has no insurable interest. There is no legal justification for the creation
of such a risk to an insured and there is no social gain in the writing of a void
policy of insurance. Where this court has found that such policies are unreasonably dangerous to the insured because of the risk of murder and for this
reason has declared such policies void, it would be an anomaly to hold that
insurance companies have no duty to use reasonable care not to create a situation
which may prove to be a stimulus for murder." 15
The contention by the defendants in the Weldon case that such a duty
imposes an unreasonable burden on the insurance companies was dismissed
by the court. It stated that it is no more difficult to determine whether a
person has an insurable interest before the policy is issued and thereby avoid
the risks involved than it is to determine the same set of facts after the death
of the insured when it becomes necessary to pay the amount due on the policy. 6
As has been previously stated, the insurance companies knew Mrs. Dennison
was the aunt of the insured. It can hardly be said that it would have been
an impossible task for them to determine whether she had the required insurable interest. The insurance companies even ignored the rules in their
respective policies requiring an insurable interest by the party purchasing the
policy. As an added factor, the deceased was a small child, defenseless and
unable to protect herself. In the case of Prudential Insurance Company v.
Jenkins," the court said: "The insurance of children who are helpless and
under the control and authority of others, is susceptible of such possibilities
of evil that it should not be encouraged." Further, none of the insurance
companies sought to obtain the consent of the child's parents."
15 100 So.2d at 708.
16 Ibid.
17 15 Ind. App. 297, 43 N.E. 1056, 57 Am. St. Rep. 228 (1896).
18 100 So.2d at 707.
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It is hardly unreasonable to require insurance companies to exercise
reasonable care before they issue a policy to one having no insurable interest.
Otherwise, the insurance companies have nothing to lose, since they do not
have to pay the due amount of the policy for the reason that it is illegal and
void. Unscrupulous companies can issue such policies, collect the premiums
and then be relieved of any obligation to pay the policy benefits. The policy
owner does have the right in the absence of fraud or deception on his part
to recover the premiums, but if for any reason they are not recovered, the
insurance companies have been unjustly enriched. A beneficiary under a contract of personal insurance who murders the insured cannot recover the policy
benefits.' " This does not mean, however, that the insurer is absolutely relieved of all liability under the contract. Proceeds are payable to the estate
of the murdered insured,2" except: 2 (1) Where the policy was procured
by the beneficiary intending at the time the insurance was secured to murder
the insured; 2 (2) Where the policy specifically makes the contract entirely
void in such contingency; and2 (3) If there are no heirs other than the
beneficiary who has produced the insured's death.2 4 In relation to the third
exception, it is to be noted that at least one state holds that the proceeds will
go to the state." The situation in the Weldon case falls within the first exception. The cases where the insurer is liable to the estate of the insured for the
proceeds refer only to situations where an insurable interest existed at the
time the policy was issued and was therefore valid.
There are situations, however, where strict compliance with the insurable
interest rule on the part of the insurance companies may create a problem.
For instance, life insurance companies that issue policies through vending
machines to people who are taking a trip, such as an airplane trip, may have
to restrict their method of issuing those policies. This would be true, even
if it is stated on the policy that only the person making the trip can purchase
the policy. It does not remove the possibility that a person who is ignorant
of the law will purchase such a policy on the life of one making a trip, and
19 Protective Life Insurance Co. v. Linson, 245 Ala. 493, 17 So.2d 761 (1944); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20 § 3442 (1941), "Slayer Act"; See APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAWS AND PRAcTICE § 381 (1941).
20 Robinson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. of Virginia, 69 Pa. Super. 274 (1918); Moore
v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 342 Pa. 570, 21 A.2d 42 (1941); See APPLEMAN, op. Cit.
supra § 381.
21 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra § 382.
22 National Aid Life Ass'n. v. May, 201 Oki. 450, 207 P.2d 292 (1949).
23 Markland v. Modern Woodmen of America, 210 S.W. 921 (1919).
24 Spicer v. New York Life Insurance Co., 268 F. 500, (C. C. A. Ala. 1920).
25 West Coast Life Insurance Co. v. Crawford, 58 Cal. App. 2d 777, 138 P.2d 384 (1943).
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then proceed to sabotage the flight,"0 with the hope of recovering the insurance
proceeds. Though the policy is illegal and void, it nevertheless presents
the temptation to commit the act to one who is either ignorant or insane. This
produces a conflict of public policies. On the one hand there is the desire to
protect human life, and on the other there is the benefit derived by the public
in being able to purchase trip insurance at a reasonable rate. Is it desirable
to restrict the use of policies of this nature, or at least make them more expensive, or is it better to maintain the status quo and thereby run the risk of
causing the loss of human life? It seems quite feasible for insurance companies to hire personnel to issue the policies without having to raise their
rates exorbitantly, since they already have high rates in view of the low
accident rate in air travel and the short term of the policy. The degree of
reasonable care that would be required here would be that they check and
verify that only a passenger making a flight is issued a policy.
Though the insurance companies may be negligent for their failure to
exercise reasonable care in issuing a life insurance policy to a party who has
no insurable interest in the life of the insured, liability is imposed only if the
injury or death was proximately caused by their negligent conduct. The
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.27 The rule used by
the majority of the courts, including Pennsylvania, and applied in the Weldon
case, is set forth in the Restatement of Torts 28 as follows:
"The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is
a superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the
actor's negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to
the third person to commit such a crime, unless the actor at the time of his
negligent conduct should have realized the likelihood that such a situation
might be created thereby and that a third person might avail himself of the
opportunity to commit such a crime." (Italics added.)
In line with the Restatement of Torts,2" the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
in the case of Smith v. Cohen, 0 said: "If, at the time of the original negligence,
John Gilbert Graham, by placing
26 Graham v. People, 302 P.2d 737 (1956).
mother's luggage, blew up a United Air Lines DC-6B, on November 1, 1955. He
life insurance policies in the amount of $37,500 prior to the flight. The policies
mother as the insured and himself as the beneficiary. He was convicted of murder
to death.
27 See 38 AM. JUR. § 50.
2 8
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 448.
29 Ibid.
30 Smith v. Cohen, 116 Pa. Super. 395, 176 A. 869 (1935).

a bomb in his
had purchased
designated his
and sentenced
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the criminal act could have been foreseen, the causal chain is not broken by
the intervening criminal act."
The contention by the defendants in the Weldon case was that the separate,
independent, intervening, superseding, wilful, malicious crime of murder became "the responsible cause" of the death of Shirley Dianne Weldon." Therefore, the issue is whether the criminal act of Mrs. Dennison could have been
foreseen by the insurance companies. The court in the Weldon case said:
"We cannot agree with the defendants in their assertion that we should
hold as a matter of law that the murder of the young girl was not reasonably
foreseeable. They created a situation of a kind which this court and others
have consistently said affords a temptation to a recognizable percentage of
humanity to commit murder." 32
It was decided in the Weldon case that the criminal act was reasonably
foreseeable by the insurance companies. Whether other courts will reach
the same conclusion, based on a similar set of facts, is mere speculation since
the situation presented in the Weldon case, according to the Supreme Court
of Alabama, is new and has never been decided elsewhere in this country.
Trip insurance extends the possibility of such a situation occurring again. Much
depends on how far the various courts are willing to go in their interpretation of what criminal acts are reasonably foreseeable. In the recent Pennsylvania case of Farley v. Sley System Garages,3 the court said that the Restatement of Torts " applies only to criminal acts under special circumstances, such
as where a railroad ignores the warnings of the plaintiff that vagrants and
hoboes loiter around the railroad station in the early hours of the morning,
and that she is alone and unprotected, and subsequently she is in fact assaulted
and ravished. Here, the railroad should have foreseen the criminal act and
its failure to act was a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff.
On the face, there is a distinction between the Weldon case and the Neering case in that the defendant in the latter case, having received warning, was
placed on notice of the risk. However, if it is accepted that the statutory or
policy prohibition against issuing policies of insurance to persons having no
insurable interest is based in part on the ground that it will discourage or
prevent risk of harm to the insured, theh the statute or policy itself
31 100 So.2d at 709.
at 711.
144 A.2d 600 (1958). Plaintiff was struck by an automobile stolen from the garage of the
defendant. The court held that the criminal act of the thief was an intervening cause between the
defendant's negligent act and plaintiff's injury. Defendant owed a duty only to the owner of the
car, not
to the world.
3
4 RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs, § 448.
3
5Neering v. Illinois Central R. Co., 383 Il. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943).
.321d.
33
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would seem to constitute sufficient notice to all insurers. Whether other
courts will accept. and will decide that a criminal act such as occurred in
the Weldon case was one of special circumstances, is again mere speculation.
It would, however, be in line with the new trend in the law of Torts, evidenced
by cases which decide negligence on the basis of whether one's interests are
subjected to one or more hazards, rather than on the theory of proximate
cause. The Restatement of Torts " states that the actor's negligence lies in
his subjecting the other to certain hazards. The duty established by law to
abstain from the negligent conduct is established in order to protect the other
from the risk of having his interest invaded by one or more of this limited
number of hazards. The problem which is involved in determining whether
a particular intervening force is or is not a superseding cause is in reality a
problem of determining whether the risk that the force would intervene was,
at least, one of the reasons for imposing the duty upon the actor to refrain
from the negligent conduct. If the duty is imposed in part, at least, to protect
the other from the risk of being harmed by the intervening force, or by the
effect of the intervening force operating on the conditions created by the negligent conduct, then the intervening force is not a superseding cause. If the
hazard is considered in retrospect to be highly extraordinary, however, the
court is likely to hold that the defendant is not liable for the harm caused
by his conduct. The actor's conduct is negligent if it creates an unreasonable
risk of harm to a class of persons of which the other is a member by subjecting
the other to the hazard from which the harm results. In order that a negligent actor be held liable for harm resulting to another from his conduct, it is
only necessary that it be the cause.37 To be the legal cause, the defendant's
conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, or in other
words his conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause."8
The recent case of Genovay v. Fox " held that once a duty is found on
the part of the defendant to refrain from exposing the plaintiff to a particular
hazard that is likely to cause him harm, though the risk of harm to the plaintiff is attributable to voluntary activity of others not under control of the defendant, it does not preclude him from liability if the harm by human inter86RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 281, comment f; comments e and ee, as amended.
87 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 430, comment d; comment a, as amended. The word "the"
here means the sole and even the predominant cause.
38 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 431, comment a.

89 50 N..J. Super. 538, 143 A.2d 229 (1958).
Action against proprietor of bowling alley-bar
for injuries sustained by customer in conflict with armed robber. Although the proprietor had no
duty to his customers to protect his premises against robbery, he had a duty not to precipitate the
conflict by conduct suggesting that the robber was subject to attack. An appeal to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey has been granted.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW.

[VOL. 63

vention was foreseeable and a reasonable man so situated would take precautions to prevent it. In referring to proximate cause, the court said: "that
foreseeability in the negligence field is more appropriately allocable to the
sphere of definition of duty than to that of proximate cause."
Notwithstanding this new development and trend, as expressed in the
Restatement of Torts and the Fox case, it seems plausible that the result on facts
similar to those of the Weldon case would be the same in other jurisdictions.
As was stated earlier, it is foreseeable that the resulting premature death of
the insured may occur if he is exposed to the particular hazard of having his
life insured by one who has no insurable interest and who is not interested
in having his life continue, but who is interested in ending it.
It will be interesting to observe to what extent the decision in the Weldon
case will stimulate insurance companies to alter their methods of investigating
prospective purchasers and to maintain a tighter control over their agents.
Higher rates of insurance should not necessarily ensue, since a more diligent
investigation by insurers will reduce the possibility of repetition of such a
situation as that which arose in the Weldon case. The burden imposed on
the insurance companies, to use reasonable care before issuing life insurance
policies to persons having no insurable interest is slight when compared with
the risk involved in the possibility of the loss of human life. The insurance
companies have a duty not to expose individuals to a hazard that may cost
them their lives. Such an event is foreseeable by insurers in view of their
knowledge of the law and of human behavior gleaned from past experience
and consonant with the nature of their business. The decision in the Weldon
case indicates progress in that it balances the slight cost of investigation
against the value of a human life. Other courts would do well to follow the
lead of the Alabama Supreme Court when and if a similar situation is presented to them.
EMMANUEL H.

DIMIou.

